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that regardless of benign intent, 
Johnson's policy of treating male and 
female employees differently was fa-
cially discriminatory. To bolster its 
conclusion, the Court cited the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
which provides that sex-based discrimi-
nation "includes discrimination 'be-
cause of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions.'" Id. at 1203 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k». 
Finding Johnson's policy discrimi-
natory, the Court proceeded to deter-
mine whether the policy could be ex-
cused as a BFOQ. After examining the 
statutory basis ofthe BFOQ standard, 
the Court emphasized that the defense, 
particularly for safety exceptions, 
"reaches only special situations." Id. at 
1204-05. Such special situations rec-
ognized by the Court included permit-
ting a prison to hire only male guards in 
areas of maximum security prisons 
housing males, and attempting to en-
sure airline safety by approving age 
restrictions for airline flight engineers. 
To qualify as a BFOQ, however, 
the ''job qualification must relate to the 
'essence,' orto the 'central mission of 
the employer's business.'" Id. at 1205 
(citations omitted). Relating the J ohn-
son facts to the BFOQ standards, the 
Court concluded that the standard was 
not met because a genuine concern for 
future generations cannot be recast as 
an "essential aspect ofbatterymaking." 
Id. at 1206. 
The Court also engaged in legisla-
tive history analysis of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, which has its own 
BFOQ criterion. The Act provides 
that, unless pregnant employees differ 
in their ability to perform, they must be 
treated the same as any other employee. 
Further, the Act's legislative history 
revealed Congress's decision to re-
serve to women the right to work while 
pregnant, or while capable of so be-
coming. Because the record indicated 
that pregnant women are as efficient as 
other employees in the manufacture of 
batteries, the Court concluded that the 
standard for upholding a BFOQ had 
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not been met. Having failed to estab-
lish either a business necessity defense 
or a BFOQ, the Court held that 
Johnson's policy constituted forbid-
den sex discrimination. Id. at 1207. 
The Court briefly addressed the is-
sue oftort liability. Because ''Title VII 
bans sex-specific fetal- protection poli-
cies," the Court felt the risk of liability 
of an employer who follows OSHA 
guidelines, informs women as to the 
risk, and is not otherwise negligent to 
be "remote at best." Id. at 1208. 
Justice White, joined by Justice 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
concurred with a portion of the 
majority's rationale, as well as with the 
judgment. The concurrence disagreed, 
however, ''that the BFOQ defense is so 
narrow that it could never justify a sex-
specific fetal protection policy." Id. at 
1210. White indicated that onejustifi-
cation for a BFOQ would be the avoid-
ance of substantial tort liability. As 
pertaining to the facts, White felt that it 
was not clear that Title VII would 
preempt state tort liability. He further 
stated that even if employees were 
precluded from making claims for in-
jury, their children still might be able 
to do so because ''the general rule is 
that parents cannot waive causes of 
action on behalf of their children." Id. 
at 1211. 
In holding that an employer may 
not discriminate against a woman on 
the basis ofher pregnancy or capability 
to become pregnant, the Supreme Court 
has furthered the beneficient goal of 
eradicating sex-based discrimnation 
Bound only by moral and ethical regu-
lation, however, expectant parents will 
be forced to engage in a most difficult 
balancing test, positing pecuniary in-
terests against the interest in insuring a 
healthy child. 
- Howard Cohen 
Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia: MARY-
LAND RESTRUCTURES THE 
LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
IN NON-INTENTIONAL TORT 
CASES. 
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 
A.2d 633 (Md. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland pronounced 
sweeping changes respecting awards 
of punitive damages in non-intentional 
tort actions. In the first of three revo-
lutionary changes to Maryland law, the 
court abolished the longstanding "aris-
ing out of contract" test for punitive 
damages in tort actions where the par-
ties enjoy a contractual relationship. 
Second, the court reformulated the stan-
dard for determining whether punitive 
damages may be awarded by rejecting 
the established "implied malice" stan-
dard and adopting the exacting "actual 
malice" standard of conduct in its place. 
Third, the court announced that in all 
tort cases, plaintiffs must meet the 
heightened burden of proof of "clear 
and convincing" evidence when seek-
ing punitive damages. 
As a result of exposure to asbestos, 
plaintiffs William L. Zenobia 
("Zenobia") and Louis L. Dickerson 
("Dickerson") developed pleural and 
parenchymal asbestosis. Zenobia al-
leged that he had been exposed to 
asbestos while employed at various 
locations over a twenty-five month 
period from 1948 to 1968. Dickerson 
claimed exposure to asbestos during 
his employment with the Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation at Sparrows Point 
from 1953 until 1963. 
Both plaintiffs filed claims in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City seek-
ing damages for their asbestos related 
injuries and the complaints were con-
solidated for purposes of trial and ap-
peal. At trial, the plaintiffs abandoned 
all theories of liability except for strict 
liability under Section 402 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. The de-
fendants included six companies that 
had either manufactured or supplied 
and installed products containing as-
bestos. 
The jury awarded Zenobia com-
pensatory damages in the amount of 
$1,200,000 against all four defendants 
named in his suit and punitive dam-
ages were assessed against manufac-
turer Owens-Illinois, Incorporated 
("Owens-Illinois") in the amount of 
$235,000 and against supplier and in-
staller Porter Hayden Company ("Por-
ter Hayden") for $2,500. The jury 
awarded Dickerson compensatory dam-
ages of $1,300,000 against all five 
defendants named in his suit. He also 
was awarded punitive damages against 
Owens-Illinois in the amount of 
$235,000, against Porter Hayden in the 
amount of$2,500 and against Celotex 
Corporation ("Celotex") in the amount 
of $372,000. 
All defendants, except Celotex, ap-
pealed the awards to the Court ofSpe-
cial Appeals of Maryland. The court 
affirmed all aspects of the awards for 
compensatory damages. It also af-
firmed the awards of punitive damages 
against Owens-Illinois, but reversed 
the awards of punitive damages against 
Porter Hayden. Owens-Illinois chal-
lenged the award of punitive damages 
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
The court granted certiorari and or-
dered the parties to address the issue of 
what the correct standard should be for 
an award of punitive damages in neg-
ligence and products liability in Mary-
land. Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d at 647. 
The court began its review of pun i-
tive damages by noting concern over 
the recent proliferation ofpuniti ve dam-
ages claims, awards, and amounts of 
awards in tort cases. Id. at 648 (citing 
2 James D. GhiardiandJohnJ. Kircher, 
Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 
2l.01, at 2 (1985)). "Accompanying 
this increase in punitive damages 
claims, awards and amounts ofawards," 
the court opined, "[was] renewed criti-
cism of the concept of punitive dam-
ages in a tort system designed prima-
rily to compensate injured parties for 
harm." Id. The court asserted that such 
criticism was justified because "juries 
[were] provided with imprecise and 
uncertain characterizations ofthe type 
of conduct which [would] expose a 
defendant to a potential award of pun i-
tive damages." Id. Moreover, the 
court noted that the trial court and the 
court of special appeals had required 
the plaintiffs to prove, by a preponder-
ance of evidence, that the defendants 
had acted with "implied malice." Id. 
Although this standard was consistent 
with Maryland law, the plaintiffs were 
not required to show "actual malice," 
which historically had been a con-
comitant of punitive damages. Thus, 
the court concluded that it was neces-
sary to re-evaluate the basic standard 
of wrongful conduct which would give 
rise to punitive damages awards in 
negligence actions generally, and prod-
uct liability cases specifically. Id. 
The court began its re-examination 
of punitive damages under Maryland 
law by overruling H&R Block v. 
Testerman, 338 A.2d 48 (Md. 1975) 
and Wedeman v. City Chevrolet, 366 
A.2d 7 (Md. 1976), summarily aban-
doning the "arising out of contract" 
distinction, which had existed for the 
purpose of awarding punitive damages 
in tort actions involving a contractual 
relationship. Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d 
at 649. "Under the Testerman-
Wedeman rule ... the basic standard 
for exposure to punitive damage liabil-
ity would vary depending on whether 
the wrongful conduct took place be-
fore or after the formation of the con-
tract." Id. The court emphasized that 
the historical purposes of punitive dam-
ages were punishment and deterrence, 
and accordingly punitive awards should 
be based exclusively upon the "hei-
nous nature of the defendant's tortious 
conduct." Id. (citingSchaeferv. Miller, 
587 A.2d 491,503 (Md. 1991)). Be-
cause the T esterman-Wedeman rule fo-
cused on when a defendant acted, in-
stead of how a defendant acted, the 
court found it inconsistent with the 
established purposes of punitive dam-
ages, and therefore, bad law. I d. at 650. 
Next, the court re-examined the 
standard of conduct which governed 
an award of punitive damages. Until 
1972, Maryland courts applied the "ac-
tual malice" standard of conduct. Id. 
In Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 
297 A.2d 721 (Md. 1972), however, 
the court of appeals allowed an award 
of punitive damages based upon "im-
plied malice" for the first time in a non-
intentional tort case. Owens-Illinois, 
601 A.2d at 650 (citing Smith, 297 
A.2d at 731). The court criticized the 
adoption of the implied malice stan-
dard as having "led to inconsistent 
results and frustration ofthe purposes 
of punitive damages .... " Id. at 651 
(citing Schaefer, 587 A.2d at 508). 
Moreover, the court noted that such 
awards were arbitrary and unpredict-
able and thus, could not serve their 
primary purpose of de terrence. There-
fore, the court overruled Smith and its 
progeny and reinstated an "actual mal-
ice" standard for all non-intentional 
tort actions. Id at 652. The court 
defined "actual malice" as conduct that 
"was characterized by evil motive, in-
tent to injure, ill will, or fraud." Id. at 
652-53 (citing Davis v. Gordon, 36 
A.2d 699, 701 (Md. 1944)). 
Next, the court recognized that "ac-
tual malice," as they had defined the 
term, did not readily lend itself to a 
typical products liability case because 
ofthe remote chance that a victim of a 
dangerous product could establish that 
a manufacturer or supplier specifically 
intended to harm a particular consumer. 
Id. at 653. Consequently, the court 
clarified the test for determining 
whether "actual malice" existed in a 
products liability case. In such cases a 
plaintiff must prove· that a defendant 
had actual knowledge of the defect and 
deliberately disregarded the foresee-
able harm to the consumer. Id. 
Finally, the court reached the issue 
of which standard of proof should be 
required for an award of punitive dam-
ages. The court observed that "[t]he 
function of the standard of proof is to 
'allocate the risk of error between the 
litigants and to indicate the relative 
importance attached to the ultimate 
decision. ,,, Id. at 655 (quoting 
Addingtonv. Texas, 441 U.S.418,423 
(1979)). The court noted that Mary-
land already required the clear and 
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convincing evidence standard in civil 
cases when "fraud, dishonesty, orcrimi-
nal conduct [was] imputed .... " Id. at 
655-56(citingFirstNat'IBankv. us.F. 
& G. Co., 340 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975)}. 
The court concluded that in order to 
further the purposes inherent in puni-
tive damages and because of their pe-
nal nature the "[u]se of a clear and 
convincing standard of proof [would] 
help to insure that punitive damages 
[were] properly awarded." Id. at 657. 
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, the 
court of appeals clearly attempted to 
"fix" Maryland law regarding jury 
awards of punitive damages. How-
ever, in adjusting the scales of justice, 
the court simply tilted the scales in the 
opposite direction. While the elimina-
tion of the "arising out of contract" 
distinction was appropriate in light of 
the arbitrariness ofthe rule, and the use 
of clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard was justified by the penal impli-
cation of punitive damages, the court 
tilted the scales in favor of the defen-
dant when it adopted the "actual mal-
ice" standard of conduct. As a result, 
plaintiffs who clearly have been the 
victims of a grossly negligent defen-
dant will find little redress in the Mary-
land courts. 
- Laurie Ann Garey 
Kingv. St. Vincent'sHospital: MEM-
BERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CIVIL-
IAN REEMPLOYMENT UNDER 
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d} REGARDLESS 
OF THE DURATION OF ACTIVE 
DUTY. 
Justice Souter, writing for a unani-
mous court, authored King v. St. 
Vincent'sHosp., 112 S. Ct. 570(1991}, 
which resolved the conflict surround-
ing the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. 
section 2024(d}(1981 & Supp. 1992}, 
which is known as the Veterans' 
Reemployment Rights Act. The Court 
held that section 2024(d} does not im-
plicitly limit the length of military 
service after which a member of the 
armed forces retains the right to civil-
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ian reemployment. 
William "Sky" King, a member of 
the Alabama National Guard, applied 
to become a Command Sergeant Ma-
jor in the Active Guard/Reserve 
("AGR"}program. Athreeyeartourof 
duty was required by army regulations 
of the person holding that position. 
Upon learning ofhis appointment, King 
notified his employer, St. Vincent's 
Hospital, of his acceptance, requested 
a three year leave of absence, and re-
ported for duty as ordered. Several 
weeks later, St. Vincent's notified him 
that his request was unreasonable and 
was therefore beyond the Act's guar-
antee of reemployment. St. Vincent's 
then brought an action fora declaratory 
judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Northern Ala-
bama to settle the question of whether 
the applicable terms of the Act provide 
reemployment rights after tours of duty 
as long as King's. 
The district court held that service 
in the AGR program was protected 
under section 2024( d), but that a three 
year leave of absence was per se unrea-
sonable. King, 112 S. Ct. at 572. The 
court's reasoning paralleled the opin-
ions of the third, fifth and eleventh 
circuits which had held that leave re-
quests under section 2024( d} must meet 
a test of reasonableness. A panel ofthe 
eleventh circuit affirmed the district 
court's decision. Due in part to the fact 
that the fourth circuit had declined to 
accept a reasonableness standard, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict among the circuits. 
The Supreme Court began its analy-
sis by recognizing the importance of 
the wording of section 2024( d), which 
contains no express time limitations. 
The Court noted that the fourth circuit 
had found that the words appear to 
guarantee that leave and reemployment 
be "unequivocal and unqualified," 
whereas the eleventh circuit had ac-
knowledged that the subsection "does 
not address the 'reasonableness' of a 
reservist's leave request". King, 112 
S. Ct. at 573 (quoting Kolkhorst v. 
Tilghman, 897 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 
(1992»; Gulf States Paper Corp. v. 
Ingraham, 811 F.2d 1464, 1468 (11th 
Cir. 1987)}. St. Vincent's argued that 
"leave," as used in subsection (d), ap-
plies to an "employee," implying that 
the employment relationship contin-
ues during the employee's absence and 
that this relationship is incompatible 
with a leave as long as King's. St. 
Vincent's further argued that a leave of 
this duration would create a burden on 
the hospital to temporarily fill King's 
position for three years until he re-' 
turned to resume his job. 
The Court responded by first recog-
nizing that there is a burden placed on 
employers by this section, however, 
the Court found that it was not "free to 
tinker with the statutory scheme." King, 
112 S. Ct. at 573. The Court further 
stated that it could not render the stat-
ute "susceptible to interpretive choice" 
no matter how great the burden. Id. In 
analyzing the statutory scheme, the 
Court noted that while "subsection (d) 
is utterly silent about any durational 
limit on the protection it provides, 
other subsections of section 2024, pro-
tecting other classes of full-time ser-
vice personnel, expressly limit the pe-
riods of their protection." King, 112 
S.Ct. at 573-74. From this, the Court 
concluded that the simplicity of sub-
section (d) was deliberate and intended 
to provide its benefit without imposing 
conditions on the length of service. 
The Court also explained that it fol-
lowed the "cardinal rule that a statute is 
to be read as a whole," and ''the canon 
that provisions for benefits to mem-
bers of the Anned Services are to be 
construed in the beneficiaries favor." 
Id. at 574. 
The Court next addressed st. 
Vincent's misapplication of the prin-
ciple that a statute is to be read as a 
whole. Although the hospital read the 
statutory scheme to show a hierarchy 
of reemployment rights, the Court held 
that the differences in treatment among 
the various sections of the Act do not 
necessarily amount to a hierarchy. Id. 
at 574. Instead, the Court stated that 
